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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(g) (1988) as an appeal from a 
domestic relations case concerning issues of property division. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent adopts the Issues Presented on Appeal by 
the appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal originates from a six-day bench trial 
commencing on June 30, 1987 and continuing from time to time 
through July 30, 1987 before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. 
On July 17, 1986, plaintiff Alfred J. Neilson brought this 
action against defendant Carleen (Collram-MQffitt) Neilson to 
annul their four-month old marriage and to have a Prenuptial 
Agreement (Prenuptial Agreement ["Agreement"], dated February 
25, 1986) declared void and unenforceable. (R. 2-17.) 
At the conclusion of trial, the court, on its own 
motion, entered a Decree of Divorce in favor of plaintiff on 
the grounds of mental cruelty and irreconcilable differences 
between the parties.1 The court also found that the language 
of the Agreement was violative of public policy and declared 
the same null and void. As additional reasons to divide 
marital property not consistent with the Agreement, the court 
irreconcilable differences was added as a recognized ground 
for divorce effective April 2, 1987 by Chapter 106, Section 1, 
Laws of Utah (1987). 
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concluded that defendant breached the specific terms of the 
Agreement by not providing a good faith marital relationship 
and by failing to contribute to the marriage her income and 
property, as required by the Agreement. It further noted that 
even though the court did not exercise its equitable powers, 
the court found it had the equitable power to review the 
Agreement and dispose of property as equity would require. 
After a complete review of the evidence, the court 
awarded all of the plaintiff's premarital property to him. The 
court awarded to defendant (1) the wedding ring, (2) wedding 
band, (3) Rolex watch; (4) Lladro figurine (all having an 
approximate aggregate value of $14,000); (5) the defendant's 
premarital automobile (the obligation for which was paid off by 
the plaintiff); (6) a Corvette Sting Ray automobile worth 
approximately $9,000; (7) $12,000 cash or cash equivalence 
acquired by the defendant during the marriage or separation; 
and (8) all wedding gifts in defendant's possession. The court 
also required defendant to pay her own attorneys' fees from the 
proceeds of the sale of any or all of the above-listed items, 
expressing that the defendant should not profit from this 
short-term relationship considering that she neither changed 
her living status nor provided a normal marital relationship to 
plaintiff. 
The defendant below filed this appeal seeking a 
reversal of the trial court's determinations and seeking 
specific enforcement of the Agreement which, in her opinion, 
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would compel transfer to her of one-half of the plaintiffs 
stock holdings valued at approximately $800,000, together with 
an award for attorneys* fees. Defendant also seeks to reverse 
a finding of contempt for violation of an order of the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner. However, for reasons expressed below, 
this issue is moot. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a sixty-seven year old retired executive 
vice president of Neilson Brothers Energy Company. He met 
defendant Carleen Collram-Moffitt, a thirty-one year old 
banking executive, in mid-December of 1985 at a social 
occasion. In January 1986, the parties began dating 
frequently. On January 18, 1986, defendant called plaintiff in 
tears asking if she could move into his home since she was 
being evicted from her apartment and was financially 
destitute. (See Trial Transcript [HTr.M], pp. 7-8.) Plaintiff 
offered to advance her the necessary funds to move into an 
apartment of her own. However, the following day, defendant 
called and asked if she could move in with him immediately. 
Plaintiff allowed this, but only on the condition that her stay 
would be considered temporary since he was concerned that his 
family would view her living there as being improper. (Tr., 
pp. 7-8.) On January 21, 1986, defendant moved into 
p^intiffs home, in a separate bedroom, bringing with her a 
large volume of clothing and other personal effects. (Tr., 
p. 10.) 
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During the days that followed, the parties* 
relationship grew to a point where they were in fact discussing 
marriage arrangements. In the beginning, defendant doted over 
plaintiff. She exhibited herself as being a warm, loving and 
affectionate individual primarily concerned for plaintiffs 
well-being and was very supportive of his conservative 
religious lifestyle. (Tr., pp. 12-14.) Wedding plans were 
made for a March 1, 1986 marriage date. 
Prior to the marriage, the parties had numerous 
discussions relating to their expectations of a normal marital 
relationship (including sexual), their religious values and 
beliefs, their family values and beliefs, and their 
philosophies and loyalties toward one another. Plaintiff is a 
practicing and active member of the LDS Church. Defendant was 
raised by a family who shared similar religious values, 
attended church activities with plaintiff prior to the 
marriage, and plaintiff believed she too would support his 
religious activities. (Id.) After the marriage, defendant 
refused to attend church activities with plaintiff. 
Prior to the wedding day, the parties had discussions 
concerning family finances. (Tr., pp. 20-39.) Plaintiff 
described the source of his dividend income and told defendant 
that they had to live within this income. (Tr., pp. 20-24.) 
These fineacial discussions culminated in the preparation of a 
prenuptial agreement wherein plaintiff agreed to provide as a 
demonstration of his love and affection toward defendant 5% of 
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his stock holdings in Texas Eastern Corp. for each year of 
their marriage until defendant held 50% of plaintiffs stock 
holdings in Texas Eastern Corp., then valued in excess of 
$800,000. Clearly,"this stock represented plaintiffs major 
premarital asset which provides the majority of income 
necessary for his monthly expenditures. After some amendments 
were made at the defendant's request, the Agreement was 
executed on February 25, 1986 at the law office of the attorney 
representing both parties to the transaction. (See Conclusions 
of Law, No. 5; Tr., pp. 33-36.) 
Plaintiffs generosity to defendant was typified by 
his paying off in excess of $10,000 worth of defendant's 
premarital debt, including a $6,000 personal loan upon which 
she had pledged her car, a debt of $1,015.29 to ZCMI and $2,200 
to medical providers for defendant's purported cyst operation. 
Plaintiff also purchased a wedding ring which cost in excess of 
$8,500, dresses for defendant's mother and bridesmaids, and a 
wedding band ordered by defendant without plaintiffs 
knowledge. It is uncontested in the record that defendant came 
into this relationship with substantial debt and few personal 
assets, whereas plaintiff, after a full business career, came 
into the marriage with a substantial net worth designed to 
provide for his retirement. (Tr., pp. 25-30.) 
One day before the marriaci ceremony, defendant 
disclosed to plaintiff that she had ordered an expensive 
wedding band ($4,000) in spite of the fact both parties had 
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earlier agreed they could not afford that additional expense. 
(Tr., pp. 30-31.) Plaintiff agreed to sell additional stock to 
cover the $4,000 bill, but only after defendant stated she 
would not expend any substantial sum of money during the 
marriage without plaintiff's express knowledge and consent. It 
was later discovered (June 1986) that the wedding band had cost 
only $2,000, however, defendant had used the additional $2,000 
to purchase a necklace and diamond earings as a wedding present 
to herself! (Tr., pp. 31-32.) 
Plaintiff testified that following the marriage 
ceremony and commencing with the wedding night, defendant 
became cold, hostile, unloving, unaffectionate, unfriendly and 
totally uncommunicative with plaintiff. (Tr., 62-63.) She 
showed concern only for her financial security, her own privacy 
and her own material satisfaction. On the wedding night, 
plaintiff anticipated and expected his new bride to share his 
bed and bedroom. However, defendant announced to plaintiff her 
desire to continue to reside in the same separate bedroom that 
she had occupied during their courtship. (Tr., pp. 56, 
63-67.) 
The parties' sexual activity during the entire 
marriage consisted of the "consummation" of the marriage for 
one-half hour on March 1, 1986, and two subsequent encounters, 
one within two days of the marriage and one two months later, 
both lasting approximately one-half hour and all performed more 
out of duty than love. (Tr., pp. 55-57.) Although plaintiff 
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requested sexual interrelationships on many occasions, 
defendant rebuffed his advances claiming she was ill or too 
tired. Later, defendant began to complain that plaintiff pawed 
her. She requested that plaintiff not kiss her on the lips or 
hug or touch her. (Tr., pp. 62-63; 86-87.) 
Defendant's behavior was totally inconsistent with her 
premarital declarations. (See Tr., pp. 12-13.) Before the 
marriage even took place, defendant announced to her own 
psychotherapist. Dr. Ruth Bradshaw, that "sex was no problem". 
Moreover, she announced to plaintiff that she looked forward to 
and anticipated a normal, frequent and satisfying sexual 
relationship with him. At no time did defendant ever 
communicate dissatisfaction with plaintiffs lovemaking 
ability, nor did she ever discuss any problems with him, with 
the exception of an apparent snoring problem. Plaintiff had 
surgery to cure the problem, yet defendant still refused to 
share his bed or bedroom. 
The parties' financial problems and misunderstandings 
started shortly after their marriage ceremony. Having 
confronted defendant with the necessity to live within the 
dividend income they received every three months, defendant 
suggested that she be added as a joint payor on the checking 
account and be responsible for maintaining family expenses, 
citing her educational background (B.S. in finance) and work 
history (bank officer) to assure plaintiff of her financial 
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responsibility. (Tr., p. 69.) Plaintiff accommodated this 
request. 
After numerous refusals by defendant to show plaintiff 
the checking account or an accounting, and having received 
numerous overdraft notices from the bank, it was disclosed that 
defendant had spent the money on numerous personal purchases, 
to-wit, a Rolex watch, a Corvette Sting Ray automobile, 
clothing, entertainment and travel. (See Tr., p. 71.) She 
even attempted to buy a $147,000 home in her own name, placing 
$1,000 as a down payment which was lost to the parties when she 
failed to secure financing and close the arrangement. (Tr., 
pp. 78-81.) Within a month after receipt of the quarterly 
dividend, the parties1 bank account was $12,000 overdrawn. To 
make matters worse, Texas Eastern Corp. had placed shareholders 
on notice that dividends would be reduced in excess of 100% 
down to $1.00 per year as opposed to $2.25 per year, thus the 
plaintiff was forced to sell more shares of stock and to pay 
more income tax on those recognized sales in order to maintain 
monthly expenditures and cover the overdrafts. (Tr., pp. 
46-48; 71-73.) 
Plaintiff testified that defendant had become 
uncommunicative from the moment of the marriage ceremony. 
(Tr., p. 62.) She sought her own privacy by frequenting the 
home of her mother during the evening hours when plaintiff was 
at home, returning late directly to her bedroom and sleeping in 
the next morning until plaintiff left for the office. One 
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Sunday morning, approximately one month after the marriage 
ceremony, defendant announced to plaintiff that she was going 
to Mexico City for a few days. (Tr., pp. 66-68.) In fact, 
defendant stayed for seven days, never asking plaintiff's 
permission or informing him that she was intending to travel. 
Apparently, defendant had asked her parents to accompany her 
(expenses paid ostensibly by plaintiff) approximately two weeks 
before her intended departure date. Yet at no time did 
defendant even invite her own husband to join her on this 
trip. As noted by the court, all communication broke down to 
the point where plaintiff's only opportunity to communicate was 
through numerous notes left in the kitchen for defendant to 
see. (Tr., pp. 83-84.) 
Finally, in approximately July 1986, the parties began 
communicating only through their attorneys when plaintiff had 
left a note suggesting to defendant that since he had to sell 
some 500 shares of stock to cover her overdrafts for the 
unauthorized purchase of a Corvette Sting Ray automobile and 
the like, that that 500 share sale should be credited against 
any stock she claims in the future. Rather than respond 
directly, defendant chose to respond through an attorney. 
Thereafter, this action was filed seeking annulment of the 
marriage and declaration that the Agreement was void. 
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint, defendant 
filed a motion for order to show cause for temporary support 
and other relief. (R. 45-48.) Commissioner Sandra Peuler, 
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after hearing, recommended that defendant not receive temporary 
support, and further agreed, pursuant to stipulation of the 
parties, that each would be mutually restrained from disposing 
of or selling any property acquired during the marriage, 
including shares of stock sitting in the name of the 
defendant. (R. 75.) This stipulation was confirmed by letter 
between counsel and restated before Commissioner Peuler in open 
court. It was later determined that defendant, in 
approximately December 1986, sold some 372 shares of stock, 
netting in excess of $10,000, in clear violation of the court's 
recommendation and the parties' stipulation. (R. 214-15.) 
Thereafter, the trial court affirmed the recommendation of 
Commissioner Peuler and found defendant in contempt of court 
for knowingly violating an agreed-to order and directed 
defendant to place the remaining 900 shares of stock in the 
custody of her attorney, together with any unexpended proceeds 
from the sale of that stock. (R. 217.)2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court determined that the Agreement violated 
the public policy of this state on the ground that the terms of 
the agreement encouraged conduct that facilitates the breakup 
of the marital relationship. The trial court's conclusion was 
unquestionably correct. The offending provisions offer 
2Both plaintiff and defendant agree the court found defendant 
in contempt, however, the order submitted by plaintiff's 
attorney has not been signed and the minute entry document does 
not reflect a "contempt" citation. (R. 217, 252-254.) 
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defendant an acceleration of her receipt of 50% of plaintiffs 
stock holdings if he initiates a divorce action. Other 
jurisdictions, most notably California and Ohio, which have 
dealt with similar "profiteering" provisions in prenuptial 
agreements have determined that if the non-divorcing spouse is 
given a significant economic benefit upon the filing of a 
divorce proceeding, then such a provision is violative of its 
state's public policy. See In re Marriage of Noghrey, 215 Cal. 
Rptr. 153 (Cal.App. 6 Dist. 1985); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 
500 (Ohio 1984). 
Further, the trial court held that defendant's 
obligations toward plaintiff in this marriage failed from the 
beginning, and thus, the consideration for the Agreement 
itself, to-wit, a good faith marital relationship, failed. The 
court correctly observed that defendant did not modify her 
premarital status at all, nor was there any element of a normal 
marital relationship in this marriage. Sexual relations 
failed, communication failed, financial responsibility failed 
and sharing had failed. The trial court properly exercised its 
statutory authority under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987) to 
look beyond the express terms of the Agreement and at the 
actual expectations of the parties in arriving at an equitable 
distribution of the marital property. 
Lastly, the trial court deter lined that defendant must 
pay her own litigation costs in this proceeding from the 
property acquired by her during the marriage. On appeal, this 
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Court must properly defer to the trial court's decision on such 
matters since defendant has failed to allege sufficient grounds 
showing a clear abuse of discretion. See Evans v. Evans, 453 
P.2d 560 (Utah 1969). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT VIOLATED THIS STATE'S 
PUBLIC POLICY BECAUSE SUCH TERMS PROVIDE 
A FINANCIAL INCENTIVE TO DIVORCE. 
The trial court was correct when it ruled that the 
Agreement was contrary to the public policy of this state. As 
will be demonstrated, the court's ruling was entirely 
consistent with this state's public policy of preserving 
marital relationships and with other jurisdictions which have 
dealt with similar "profiteering" provisions in prenuptial 
agreements. 
The only provisions of the Agreement which mention 
divorce are found in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Agreement. 
Paragraph 8 recites that each of the parties had executed new 
wills which they agreed not to change, 
[Pjrovided however, that if either party commences a 
divorce action, the other party shall then be relieved 
of the obligation under this paragraph and may then 
change his or her Will. 
The implication of this paragraph is to prohibit the party 
filing for a divorce from changing his or her will at any time 
in the future, whatever the party's status or circumstance. At 
the time this agreement was executed, Utah was considered a 
"quasi no-fault" state since its law provided that a 
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demonstration of grounds or fault was still necessary to gain 
jurisdiction of the court. Extending the rationality of 
paragraph 8 of the Agreement, in light of Utah's law, produces 
the following irrational result: the party seeking to 
adjudicate another's fault is punished for doing so while the 
faulting party not only profits, but is also relieved of mutual 
obligation. This irrationality becomes more apparent in 
paragraph 9 of the Agreement. 
After promising to transfer approximatly 5% of his 
premarital stock holdings to defendant each year until 
defendant's holdings reached and equaled plaintiff's, i.e., 
50%, the parties agreed: 
In the event the parties are subsequently 
divorced in a divorce action initiated by CARLEEN, 
it is understood and agreed that the only assets she 
shall be entitled to receive from the separate 
property owned by ALFRED are the shares of Texas 
Eastern Corporation stock which has theretofore been 
transferred to her. On the other hand, if the parties 
are divorced in an action initiated by ALFRED, CARLEEN 
shall be entitled to receive, as the only property to 
be transferred by the divorce to her from the separate 
property of ALFRED, sufficient shares of Texas Eastern 
Corporation stock so that she will own at the time of 
the divorce the same number of shares of said stock as 
will then be owned by ALFRED. 
(Prenuptial Agreement, 1f 9.) In other words, if defendant 
initiates the divorce, she keeps what she got; if plaintiff 
initiates, defendant's 50% is accelerated and she does not have 
to await the 5% distribution per year. The term "initiated", 
as used in the Agreement, may mean something other than one 
party filing an action against the other. As will be 
demonstrated, no matter how the term is defined, the court 
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acted in accordance with the law and without being arbitrary or 
capricious. 
A. "Initiated" Means Filing An Action. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the term "initiated", as used 
in paragraph 9, refers to the filing of a complaint seeking 
divorce, the trial court accepted plaintiffs argument that 
defendant certainly would profit by an early termination of the 
marriage. Thus, the terms of the Agreement itself promote, 
facilitate or encourage an early break-up of the marriage to 
defendant's benefit. Accordingly, the trial court found that 
the language of the Agreement violated public policy and was 
thus void. 
It cannot be seriously argued that the public policy 
of this state has changed so drastically that it no longer 
sustains public policy pronouncements regarding the sanctity of 
marriage and family relationships. From early declarations in 
Palmer v. Palmer, 72 P. 3 (Utah 1903), through recently enacted 
legislative purpose and intent statements, as contained in the 
Family Court Act, Utah's common law and legislative 
pronouncements have consistently held that marital contracts 
are not necessarily the same as civil contracts which 
contemplate commercial relationships, but commence a status 
created by man and woman for life to which the state becomes an 
interested party and which cannot be dissolved solely upon the 
consent and agreement of both parties. 
It is the public policy of the state of Utah to 
strengthen the family life foundation of our society 
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and reduce the social and economic costs to the state 
resulting from broken homes and to take reasonable 
measures to preserve marriages, particularly where 
minor children are involved. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-11.1 (1953, as amended). 
The law is well settled that courts will refuse to 
enforce any contract, as against public policy, which 
is intended to promote the dissolution of the marriage 
status. Greenwood on Public Policy, 490-491. When 
that status is created the rights involved are not 
merely private, but they are also of public concern. 
The social system and welfare of the state having 
their foundation in the family, the state is an 
interested party, and therefore the marriage 
relationship cannot be dissolved except through 
the sovereign power. . . . 
Palmer v. Palmer, 72 P. at 7. 
Plaintiff is aware that many states, including Utah, 
have suggested variance from the traditional common law 
presumption that prenuptial agreements are void and against 
public policy. Nor does plaintiff argue that such agreement be 
considered presumptively void. See Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 
(Utah 1986). Many states have adopted a mofe liberal 
recognition of individuals' rights to contract future 
disposition of property in situations where the marriage is 
terminated not by divorce, but by death or where there has been 
no showing of coercion or undue influence together with a fair 
disclosure of facts between the parties. Other states have 
allowed parties to characterize separate property and marital 
property within an agreement in order to clarify future 
potential controversy, and still others have given presumptive 
validity to prenuptial agreements which only distribute 
property and do not bind the court's power to order support 
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between the parties. Some states are willing to recognize 
present day reality and yet balance well-founded considerations 
which built our common law public policy by imposing fairness 
or conscionability reviews upon prenuptial and antenuptial 
agreements before the court would sanction the parties* private 
contractual arrangements. Mathie v. Mathie, 363 P.2d 779 (Utah 
1961). 
Finally, many states such as Ohio and California have 
retained some of the prohibitions of public policy in support 
of the sanctity of marriage where the contract language itself 
promotes, facilitates or encourages dissolution of the marriage 
or profiteering by one party over the other. This notion is 
really the other side of the coin, if you will, of the notion 
that contracts ought to be reviewed to determine if the parties 
initially entered into them freely without coercion, distress, 
undue influence and with full disclosure of the facts and 
circumstances. Here, we have contractual language which 
insures one party's faithfulness to the marriage, but 
encourages the other to profit by an attempt to destroy the 
marriage at an early date. Not only would defendant profit by 
a dissolution of the marriage, but she profits more the faster 
it deteriorates. 
In In re Marriage of Noghrey, 215 Cal.Rptr. 153, the 
court concluded th*t a prenuptial agreement which gave the wife 
one-half of her husband's assets only upon the occurrence of 
divorce was against public policy and was unenforceable since 
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such an agreement "facilitated", "encouraged" or "promoted" 
divorce or dissolution. Id. at 156. (Quoting, In re the 
Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976)). The offending 
language which the husband signed stated: "I Kambiz Noghrey, 
agree to settle on Farima Human, the house 4 . . [i]n 
Sunnyvale, . . . [a]nd $500,000.00 or one-half of my assets, 
whichever is greater, in the event of a divorce." Id. at 154. 
The court determined that not all prenuptial agreements are 
illegal or void, but in this particular case: 
The agreement before us, however, is not of the type 
that seeks to define the character of property ac-
quired after marriage nor does it seek to ensure the 
separate character of property prior to marriage. 
This agreement is surely different and speaks to a 
wholly unrelated subject. It constitutes a promise by 
the husband to give the wife a very substantial amount 
of money and property, but only upon the occurence of 
a divorce. No one could reasonably contend this 
agreement encourages the husband to seek a dissolu-
tion. Common sense and fiscal prudence dictate the 
opposite. Such is not the case fori the wife. She, 
for her part, is encouraged by the very terms of the 
agreement to seek a dissolution, and with all deliber-
ate speed, lest the husband suffer an untimely demise, 
nullifying the contract, and the wife's right to the 
money and property." 
Id. at 156. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Gross v. 
Gross, 464 N.E.2d 50, upheld the basic validity of antenuptial 
agreements provided that the terms do not promote or encourage 
divorce or profiteering by divorce. In addressing the legality 
of prenuptial agreements, the Ohio Supreme rourt described a 
hypothetical example of the type of provision that it would 
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consider as being violative of its state's public policy. Such 
an illustration would be 
[W]here the parties enter into an antenuptial 
agreement which provides a significant sum either by 
way of property settlement or alimony at the time of 
divorce, and after the lapse of an undue short period 
of time one of the parties abandons the marriage or 
otherwise disregards the marriage vows. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Id. at 506. 
This illustration appears to mirror the facts found in 
the instant matter by the trial court. When the Agreement was 
executed, plaintiff owned approximately 25,440 shares of Texas 
Eastern Corp. stock with a value in excess of $800,000. 
Unquestionably, paragraph 9 created an enormous financial 
incentive for defendant to induce plaintiff into filing for a 
dissolution of the marriage as early as possible since she 
would receive one-half of his total stock holdings. She did so 
within "an undue short period of time" by abandoning the 
marriage and disregarding the marriage vows. 
In defendant's brief, she contends that since the 
trial court used the word "facilitate" to describe its 
conclusion that the Agreement violated the public policy of 
this state, instead of using "encourage" or "promote", that 
this Court should attach some material significance to the 
trial court's syntax choice. However, defendant's argument 
constitutes a distinction without a difference, especially 
where plaintiff successfully argued before the trial judge, 
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cited cases which use the phrase "encourage, promote and 
facilitate" divorce. (R. 327.) 
The court's use of the word "facilitate" is found in 
Finding of Fact No. 5: 
The Court further finds that the prenuptial agreement 
is void and against public policy for the reason that 
it encourages conduct designed to facilitate the 
breakup of a marital relationship. 
(R. 391-92.) Thus, the court held that the offending agreement 
encouraged conduct designed to facilitate the breakup of a 
marital relationship, not simply to facilitate the court's 
entry of a decree of divorce. If this Court adopts defendant's 
statement of the law, as set forth in In re the Marriage of 
Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, the trial court was virtually consistent 
in setting the agreement aside: 
Under the principles we have explained, [the wife] can 
succeed in overturning the trial court's order en-
forcing the agreement only if she can show the terms 
of the agreement promote or encourage the dissolution 
of their marriage. 
551 P.2d at 330. Such is the finding of this trial court which 
defendant agrees cannot be reviewed. 
Continuing the persuasive precedent from other 
jurisdictions which have held similar "profiteering" provisions 
to be contrary to its state's public policy with this state's 
interest in preserving the marital relationship, this Court 
should show appropriate deference to the trial court and concur 
with its determination that the Agreement violates this state's 
public policy. Plaintiff is well aware that half a glass of 
water can be viewed as half full to one person and half empty 
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to another. Similarly, the language of this agreement may 
promote marriage by imposing a penalty upon one party or 
promote divorce by allowing the offending party to profit. In 
this case, and based upon these facts as found and determined 
by the trial court, the Agreement itself facilitated conduct 
designed to breakup, not preserve, the marital relationship. 
B. If "Initiated" Means Started By Onees Acts Or 
Conduct, Then Consistent With The Understanding Of The Parties, 
Defendant Initiated This Divorce Action. 
Construction of the terms of the Agreement may compel 
a different result if the term "initiated", as used in 
paragraph 9 of the Agreement, is defined to mean that due to 
the fault of one party (thus initiating a cause of action), the 
other party was forced to file for a complaint in divorce. 
The court found that the Agreement did not accurately 
reflect the parties' intentions concerning divorce, and that 
there was no question but that the thinking of plaintiff at the 
time of the execution of the Agreement was not as rational as 
he would have acted in his personal business dealings. 
(Finding of Fact, No. 5.; R. 391-92.) The plaintiff testified 
that paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Agreement were understood by him 
to mean that if he were at fault in any litigation involving a 
divorce, then plaintiff would be entitled to an accelerated 
receipt of one-half of his stock holdings; that if she were at 
fault, defendant would keep only what she had been previously 
transferred as of that date. (Tr., pp. 923, 937.) 
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The trial court concluded that in fact the Agreement 
was ambiguous and did not reflect the parties' intentions, yet 
it did not make its ruling based upon that ambiguity since it 
had already declared the Agreement to violate public policy. 
Assuming that the court had not set the Agreement aside, it 
then must be asked if the court distributed property in 
accordance with the parties' intentions. If so interpreted, 
plaintiff's filing of a complaint was "initiated" by 
defendant's acts. Accordingly, paragraph 9 provides that 
defendant is entitled to keep the remaining 900 shares of 
stock3 that had been transferred into her name, having a 
value of approximately $22,00 per share. Instead of being 
awarded this stock, which would be reduced in value by taxes 
imposed upon its sale, she was awarded other property which had 
similar or greater value: the Corvette Stinq Ray automobile 
($9,000), wedding ring ($8,500), wedding band and jewelry 
($4,000), clothes and jewelry ($2,000), cash ($12,000) and 
premarital debt reduction ($10,000). Thus, the defendant has 
not been materially harmed or damaged by the court's 
disposition of property. 
C. As This Record Reflects, Plaintiff's Complaint 
Requested Declaratory Relief And Annulment Of The Marriage, Not 
Divorce. 
The f-rial court, on its own motion, modified the 
prayer of the complaint and awarded plaintiff a divorce upon 
'She had previously sold 372 shares 
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its own initiative, not at the specific request of the 
plaintiff. Accordingly, neither party initiated or commenced 
an action for divorce, and accordingly, paragraphs 8 and 9 of 
the Agreement are not effectuated by this action. 
Certainly, it cannot be seriously argued that 
defendant has suffered any material injustice during the four 
and one-half months of marriage since the trial court awarded 
her approxmately $35,000 worth of cash and hard assets. This 
amount does not include the additional $10,000 that plaintiff 
expended to extinguish defendant's premarital debt. Thus, this 
Court should defer to the trial court's findings in this 
proceeding as being fair, reasonable and within the parties1 
expectations. See Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT FAILED, AND THUS, EXCUSED 
PLAINTIFF'S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE AGREEMENT. 
The enforceability of any prenuptial contract depends, 
of course, on its own language and the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding it. As in other contract cases, the 
object is to serve the intent of the parties. Like other 
contracts, antenuptial agreements must be supported by 
consideration, though the marriage itself will ordinarily 
suffice to meet this requirement unless the circumstances 
dictate otherwise. Matter of Estate of Burgess, 646 P.2d 623 
(Okla. App. 1982). The rule is also well established that 
failure of consideration exists whenever one who has given 
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performance fails without his fault to receive in some material 
respect the agreed exchange for that performance. Bently v. 
Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984). Accordingly, in this case, 
it was entirely appropriate for the trial court to examine and 
consider the expectations of the parties when they entered into 
the prenuptial contract. 
At trial, the evidence revealed that plaintiff 
expected a traditional and normal marital relationship— 
traditional in the sense that plaintiff wanted all the rights, 
duties, loyalty, fidelity, service, fellowship, and 
companionship, etc., that the common law has implied in the 
legal, factual and practical unity of a husband and wife. See, 
41 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife § 5, ejb seq. Plaintiff also 
testified that he expected to develop a fulfilling sexual 
relationship with his new wife. However, at trial, the facts 
demonstrated that defendant never had the intent to enter into 
the type of marital relationship which would include regular 
cohabitation or meaningful sexual relations kith plaintiff. 
There was no friendship, no companionship, no loyalty—in 
short, no marriage. 
In its ruling, the court stated that defendant 
breached the agreement by her failing to "perform the marriage 
covenant", i.e., failing to change her living or sexual 
behavior once the marriage vows were exchanged. Simply put, 
defendant did not change her circumstances once she was 
married. She persisted in her habit of living alone in a 
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separate bedroom just as she had done during their courtship. 
She also became increasingly uncommunicative and within the 
first month of marriage traveled out of the home and out of the 
country without her husband. 
Further, defendant's consideration for the agreement 
failed when she mismanaged the family finances for her own 
benefit. Despite plaintiffs repeated requests to defendant to 
live within the fixed income he could provide and to see the 
checking account, defendant continued to indulge in a personal 
lifestyle of lavish excesses. Defendant's purchases without 
the knowledge of plaintiff of a 1978 Corvette Sting Ray 
automobile, jewelry and the attempted purchase in her own name 
of a $147,000 home, and numerous purchases of clothing and 
other personal items all evidence a relationship where 
defendant took advantage of plaintiff. The effect of 
defendant's actions, as earlier noted, was financially 
devastating. (Statement of Facts ["Facts"], p. 8.) 
Prior to the marriage, defendant expressed an interest 
in having sexual relations with plaintiff, however, on the 
couple's honeymoon night, while plaintiff anticipated and 
expected his wife to share his bed and bedroom, defendant told 
plaintiff that she wanted to occupy a separate bedroom as she 
had done during their courtship. Defendant continued to reside 
in her own bedroom until she left the house after the filing of 
the complaint. The parties' sexual activity during the entire 
marriage consisted of the "consummation" of the marriage on the 
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wedding night, and two subsequent encounters, one within two 
days of the marriage and one about two months later. 
Defendant's total lack of interest in having sexual relations 
with plaintiff evidences her intent not to have a traditional 
husband/wife relationship. 
In her brief, defendant contends that the trial court 
had no business interfering in the parties' right to contract, 
and further, she questioned the propriety of the trial court 
concluding that a "normal marital relationship" did not exist. 
In stating such a claim, defendant seeks to have this Court 
limit the discretion accorded a trial court in divorce matters 
by limiting its inquiry to the literal language of a prenuptial 
agreement. 
Paragraph 14 of the Agreement provides that it shall 
only become effective upon the consummation of the proposed 
marriage between the parties. The effect of the trial court's 
finding was to rule that no marriage existed. The promises, 
covenants and marital vows had been disregarded, and thus the 
underlying consideration, although given in the form of a 
promise, had failed in reality. 
Whatever the court ruled in this regard is of little 
importance as a separate issue since it voided the Agreement on 
other grounds. If this Honorable Court does not sustain that 
holding, then it is evident that the parties must return to the 
trial court for other determinations consistent with the 
court's equitable power of distribution. 
-25-
As the facts amply attest, since defendant did not 
fulfill a traditional or non-traditional marital role, the 
trial court was entirely correct in ruling that there was a 
total failure of consideration in this matter. Moreover, 
defendant's futile plea that express terms of the Agreement 
should be made binding upon the trial court, without 
considering the facts surrounding the intent of the parties and 
their expectations, would create an empty exercise of judicial 
waste. This Court must sustain the trial court's exercise of 
its statutory prerogative. 
III. PARTIES CANNOT DEFEAT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
EQUITABLE POWERS. 
The trial court opined that it had the equitable power 
to review and modify, if necessary, the disposition of property 
as originally contemplated under the Agreement,4 The genesis 
of this "fairness review" is contained in this Court's prior 
holdings in Mathie v. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779 
(1961), and Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982), and 
is mandated by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 declares: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property and parties. 
In Utah, prenuptial agreements and similar contractual 
relations between husband and wife are given consideration, but 
are not binding upon the court. In Mathie, supra, the 
4Plaintiff contends that this issue is moot so long as this 
Honorable Court sustains the trial court on the first issue 
raised, to-wit, validity of the Agreement. 
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plaintiff and defendant had entered into a reconciliation 
agreement after which they were later divorced. During the 
divorce proceeding, the court decided to divide marital 
property not in accordance with the reconciliation agreement. 
The court held in addressing the efficacy of that agreement: 
Reverting to the question of the sanctity of the 
contract, attention is directed to the fact that 
agreements between spouses to fix their property 
rights inter se during coverture are generally not 
held to be so absolute as to prevent the court under 
its equity powers in divorce actions from doing that 
which justice and equity require for the interest and 
welfare of the parties involved. . . . 
* * * 
From our examination of the authorties it appears 
that the true import of the well-considered cases 
dealing with this subject is that such agree- ments 
will be analyzed upon their own facts and are enforced 
by the courts only if they are fair and equitable and 
do not run afoul of any consideration of public policy. 
The foregoing discussion is proposed to show the 
limitations upon such agreements and to emphasize the 
careful scrutiny they ought to be given before a court 
of equity should give them effect. . . . But the real 
question is not so much whether the contract can 
properly be regarded as valid, as it is what the 
court, under its acknowledged broad equitable powers 
in divorce cases, will do in regard to the property 
and property rights of the parties, a part of which 
are the rights in such a contract. 
363 P.2d at 782-784. 
Our courts have, for many years, and to this date 
continue to allow broad equitable powers to review the 
disposition of property between parties whether or not their 
marriage is annuled or terminated by divorce, whether or not 
their contracts are entered into before or during marriage, and 
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whether or not they are presumptively valid or had been entered 
into freely and without undue influence, fraud or duress. In 
Ranney v. Ranney, 548 P.2d 734 (Kan. 1976), the court stated: 
The general rule in this state is that contracts, 
made either before or after marriage, [are valid where 
they] . . . are just and equitable in their provisions 
and are not obtained by fraud or overreaching. . . . 
548 P.2d at 737. 
Whether one describes it as a "fairness" review or a 
"conscionability" review, the underlying notion remains the 
same and has been recognized by our courts consistently. See 
Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977); Strong v. 
Strong, 548 P.2d 626 (Utah 1976); Barraclouqh v. Barraclough, 
111 P.2d 792 (Utah 1941); Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 
261 P.2d 944 (Utah 1953); Christensen v. Christensen, 422 P.2d 
534 (Utah 1967); Madsen v. Madsen, 276 P.2d 917 (Utah 1954); 
Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975). 
Defendant's reliance upon Cunningham v. Cunningham, 
690 P.2d 549 (Utah 1984), stating that a trial court's 
discretionary boundaries do not entitle that court to 
restructure a contract according to the court's desires, is 
misplaced. That case is not a divorce case, but concerns 
itself with a deed of conveyance of parcels of real property. 
The court specifically states that the trial court in that 
matter had no equitable powers and could not reform deeds 
without a finding of mistake or inequitable conduct. In these 
matters, the district court is empowered to use and exercise 
its equitable powers, and in doing so, it is not inappropriate 
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for a court to hold that the defendant's conduct and the 
resultant profit of some $400,000 for a four-month unsuccessful 
marriage would be an unconscionable result. 
IV. DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS CONTEMPTUOUS. 
Defendant next appeals from an oral finding of 
contempt for willful violation of the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner's recommendation and mutual restraining order. 
Pursuant to the Motion for Order to Show Cause Re Contempt 
filed by plaintiff in this action, and after a hearing held 
before the trial court in this matter, the court found that the 
defendant sold some 372 shares of Texas Eastern Corp. stock in 
violation of her attorney's oral and written stipulation filed 
before the Domestic Relations Commissioner, upon which the 
Commissioner recommended a mutual restraining order. 
Unfortunately, this issue, too, may be moot since a review of 
the record indicates that the plaintiffs proposed order 
memorializing the court's finding of contempt was filed 
unsigned and the court's minute entry does not reflect a 
finding of contempt. (R. 214, 236, 240-42.) 
Both plaintiff and defendant agree that, in fact, the 
court found defendant in contempt of court, just as they both 
agree that an oral and written stipulation was presented to the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner upon which she ordered a mutual 
restraining order enjoining the parties from disposing, selling 
or otherwise encumbering marital assets during the pendency of 
this action. Plaintiff is surprised that defendant and her 
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counsel raise this issue, having failed to object in any manner 
to the recommended mutual restraining order, having clearly 
testified to an awareness of the stipulated order, and being 
fully aware of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-4.4(c) (1985), stating 
that the Commissioner's recommendation becomes and is deemed to 
be an order of the court if not objected to within ten days. 
Defendant admitted at trial that she had authorized 
her counsel to represent to the Domestic Relations Commissioner 
and the court that the shares of stock would not be sold during 
the pendency of this action. (Tr., p. 959.) While the 
plaintiff cannot argue with defendant's proposition that the 
Commissioner's recommendations do not have the effect of an 
order when objections are timely filed, plaintiff also cannot 
argue with a proposition that a person should be entitled to 
rely upon an attorney's representations made on behalf of his 
client, in writing and in open court. To abandon those 
representations, based solely on the client's future conduct in 
violation of those representations, would be reprehensible and 
contemptuous. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR HER OWN ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
Generally, allowance of attorneys' fees and court 
costs in divorce cases are matters of discretion for the trial 
court, and although reviewable on appeal, such awards will not 
be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
Evans v. Evans, 453 P.2d 560. Defendant contends the trial 
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court abused its discretion by making her pay her own 
litigation costs from the property she received in the 
divorce. The defendant does not appeal from the court's 
failure to award her attorneys' fees, nor does the court 
prohibit her attorney from charging or defendant from paying 
any amount greater than what the court had ordered her to pay 
by way of judgment. 
The trial court fashioned a remedy consistent with its 
expressed views that the defendant should not profit any 
further from this short-term and extremely unsuccessful 
relationship. The case law cited in defendant's brief does not 
support the proposition that the court abuses its discretion if 
it orders a party to pay attorneys' fees out of the property 
awarded him or her, or if it orders each party to pay his or 
her own lawyer. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1953, as amended) clearly 
grants the court wide discretion in fixing and awarding costs 
to enable either party to prosecute or defend a domestic 
relations action. In responding to a similar statute, the 
Colorado Supreme Court, in Morrison v. Peck, 376 P.2d 58 (Colo. 
1962), held that a trial court does have the authority to 
assess attorneys' fees against the wife and in favor of the 
attorney representing the wife. 
Given the defendant's past actions during the course 
of this trial, it is understandable that the court wished to 
protect her own attorneys in the payment of their fees. In any 
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case, the cure to the perceived evil lies amongst the 
relationship between defendant and her attorneys, not this 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed, this Court should affirm 
the findings of the trial court in holding that the Agreement 
violated the public policy of this state by facilitating, 
encouraging and promoting conduct designed to breakup marital 
relationships. The defendant, by her conduct, clearly 
demonstrated a desire to profit from this short-term 
relationship. If, for any reason, this Court cannot uphold the 
lower court's determinations and decides to reverse, the 
appropriate remedy is to remand the same for further 
determinations consistent with the district court's equitable 
powers. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f?*~ day of August, 1988. 
5814L 
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